A three-stage experimental test of revealed preference by Hammond, Peter J. & Traub, Stefan
 http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Hammond, Peter J., 1945- and Traube, Stefan (2012) A three-stage experimental test of 
revealed preference. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, 
University of Warwick. (CAGE Online Working Paper Series). 
Permanent WRAP url: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/57768  
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-
profit purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and 
full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original 
metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here is a working paper or pre-print that may be later published 
elsewhere.  If a published version is known of, the above WRAP url will contain details 
on finding it. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: publicatons@warwick.ac.uk  
 January 2012 No.72 
 
A Three-Stage Experimental Test 
of Revealed Preference 
 
Peter Hammond & Stefan Traub 
Department of Economics & CAGE, University of Warwick 
Department of Economics & ZeS, University of Bremen 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy 
Department of Economics 
 
A Three-Stage Experimental Test
of Revealed Preference
Peter Hammonda,∗, Stefan Traubb
aDepartment of Economics & CAGE, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
bDepartment of Economics & ZeS, University of Bremen, Germany
29th January, 2012
Abstract
A powerful test of Varian’s (1982) generalised axiom of revealed preference
(GARP) with two goods requires the consumer’s budget line to pass through
two demand vectors revealed as chosen given other budget sets. In an exper-
iment using this idea, each of 41 student subjects faced a series of 16 succes-
sive grouped portfolio selection problems. Each group of selection problems
had up to three stages, where later budget sets depended on that subject’s
choices at earlier stages in the same group. Only 49% of subjects’ choices
were observed to satisfy GARP exactly, even by our relatively generous non-
parametric test.
JEL classification: C91, D83
Keywords: Rationality, revealed preference, uncertainty
∗Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coven-
try CV4 7AL, UK; phone +44 (0)24 765 23052, fax +44 (0)24 765 23032, e-mail
p.j.hammond@warwick.ac.uk.
1 Introduction
1.1 Non-Parametric Tests of GARP
Varian (1982) in particular has emphasised how easily even a rational con-
sumer could exhibit demand behaviour that fails rationality tests based on
estimating preference parameters. As an alternative, Varian proposed more
robust non-parametric tests of Samuelson’s (1938) revealed preference theory
that are based on Afriat’s (1973) theoretically derived inequalities. This ap-
proach seems ideally suited to controlled laboratory experiments, where the
price and income changes needed to test the axioms are easy to implement,
and changes of taste can largely be ruled out. Also, in general violations of
revealed preference could perhaps be explained by errors in observation, but
hardly in experimental settings. Accordingly, several papers have followed
Sippel’s (1997) pioneering application of non-parametric tests to experimen-
tal data. Depending on the experimental design, however, including the
population of experimental subjects and the test method, past experimental
studies have produced estimates of the proportion of subjects whose demands
satisfy GARP which range widely from below 10% to almost 100%.
Such results raise the fundamental question whether or not to allow for
decision errors when testing revealed preference theory. On the one hand,
normative decision theory does not condone even the slightest inconsistency;
such a strict test has enormous statistical power but an impractically small
size. On the other hand, allowing for random decision errors significantly
reduces the power of a test in discriminating between rational and random
behaviour.
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Following Varian’s (1982) own suggestion, Sippel (1997) and most suc-
cessors have based their tests on Afriat’s (1973) efficiency index. Suppose
a consumer has been observed choosing the bundle x1 when the price vec-
tor was p1. By definition x1 is revealed preferred to any alternative bundle
x2 satisfying p1x2 < p1x1. Suppose nevertheless that the same consumer
were also observed choosing the bundle x2 when the price vector is p2, where
p2x2 > p2x1. This would imply that x2 is revealed preferred to x1, and
so violate GARP. The Afriat efficiency index of the choice x2 is the ratio
p1x2/p1x1, which is evidently less than 1.
Allowing choices whose Afriat efficiency index is less than one relaxes the
GARP axiom, and so increases considerably the corresponding measure of
how well subjects’ choices comply with GARP. This increase in measured
rationality, however, comes with a dramatic decrease in statistical power.
For example, consider a budget of $100, along with two budget lines
determined by the respective price vectors p1 = (1.25, 1) and p2 = (1, 1.25),
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Assume too that at prices p1 a person chooses the
consumption bundle x1 = (x1A, x
1
B) = (64, 20), or indeed any other bundle
on the line segment joining the end point Q to the point P = (444
9
, 444
9
) ≈
(44.4, 44.4) where the two budget lines intersect. Then it is straightforward
to show that at prices p2 the supporting set of consumption bundles satisfying
GARP consists of the line segment joining P to the end point Q′ = (100, 0).
Assuming a uniform distribution of choices along this second budget line,
there is a probability of 5
9
≈ 55.6% that a player who chooses at random will
satisfy GARP.
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Figure 1: Basic Example
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Allowing an Afriat efficiency index of 0.9, however, which is equivalent
to throwing away $10 at prices p1, moves the intersection of the two budget
lines down to the point P ′ = (222
9
, 622
9
) ≈ (22.2, 62.2). This extends the
supporting set to the line segment P ′Q′, so the chance of a random choice
being classified as rational rises to 7
9
≈ 77.8%.
We refer the interested reader to their paper to Andreoni and Harbaugh
(2008) for an extensive recent discussion of the pros and cons of several
different power indices for revealed preference tests, including that of Bronars
(1987). Instead, we now proceed directly to the experimental design involved
in our own more direct test.
1.2 A Three-Stage Direct Test
Consider any list sn = (pi,xi)ni=1 of n pairs of successive price and quantity
vectors that satisfy both GARP and, for each i = 1, . . . , n, the normalization
pixi = 1. Let pn+1 be any previously unobserved price vector. Then Varian
(1982, 2006) defines the supporting set S(pn+1; sn) of consumption bundles
xn+1 as those for which the extended sequence (pi,xi)n+1i=1 also satisfies both
GARP and, for each i = 1, . . . , n+ 1, the normalization pixi = 1. As Varian
(1982) notes, the supporting set describes “what choice a consumer will make
if his choice is to be consistent with the preferences revealed by his previous
behavior” (p. 957).
Our new experimental design uses Varian’s (1982) supporting set directly.
Moreover, unlike previous tests of GARP, we seek to increase the power of
our tests by adjusting later budget lines to the consumer’s earlier choices.
Indeed, when teaching intermediate microeconomics, it is usual to explain
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the revealed preference axiom in a two-stage process. First it is assumed that
a consumer chooses a (two-dimensional) commodity bundle x1 at the price
vector p1. Second, one considers the consumer’s demands when faced with a
new price vector p2 and a new budget line p2x = p2x1 that passes through
the originally chosen bundle x1. The usual revealed preference axiom, of
course, implies that the new bundle x2 should satisfy p1x2 > p1x1.
Our experiment considers an obvious three-stage extension. The first two
stages involve observing the consumer choosing the two bundles x1 and x2
at the respective price vectors p1 and p2. Revealed preference requires the
chosen bundles to satisfy both p1x2 > p1x1 and p2x1 > p2x2. Provided this
condition was satisfied, subjects faced a third stage that involves a new price
vector p3 satisfying p3x1 = p3x2. In the two commodity case we consider,
this determines the third stage budget line p3x = p3x1 uniquely. Revealed
preference will be satisfied provided that the consumer’s third-stage choice
x3 is on the segment of the third budget line between the first two choices
x1 and x2.
In our experiment, subjects were actually confronted with a series of
16 grouped portfolio-selection problems, each group involving up to three
stages like this. As in the most important precursor to our own work, Choi
et al. (2007b), we study a portfolio selection problem for two reasons. First,
these authors were the first to test revealed preference theory with data
from risky decision making. Indeed, as far as we are aware, other scientists
have yet to reproduce their results. Second, their graphical interface seemed
highly appropriate and was relatively easy to adapt. Third, they reported
6
particularly high consistency rates among their subjects, which suggests that
applying a more powerful test could be fruitful.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section 2 describes our ex-
periment in more detail. Then Section 3 explains our nonparametric test
procedure. The results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Details of the Experiment
2.1 Typical Decision Problem
As in Choi et al. (2007a, b), in each of our decision problems there were two
states of nature s = {A,B} and two associated Arrow securities, each yielding
a payoff of one “token” of experimental currency in one state and nothing
in the other. Following the usual random lottery incentive system, at the
end of the experiment one decision problem was selected at random and each
token won in that decision problem was converted into £0.20 of UK currency.
In each decision problem, subjects had to split an initial endowment of 100
tokens between the two Arrow securities. In principle, their choices had to
satisfy the budget constraint pAxA + pBxB = 100, where ps denotes the price
and xs the demand for Arrow security s. In practice, in order to represent
the allocation problem sensibly on the computer screen, prices were rounded
off to the first decimal place, and subjects could only choose nonnegative
integer amounts of each security. In addition to the budget constraint pAxA+
pBxB ≤ 100, subjects were restricted to pairs (xA, xB) of nonnegative integers
immediately below the budget line. Specifically, we allowed any nonnegative
7
Figure 2: Example screen
integer allocation satisfying
100−max{pA, pB} < pAxA + pBxB ≤ 100.
Figure 2 reproduces an example of what an experimental subject could
see on the computer screen when faced with any of the choice problems. As
soon as a new decision problem appeared, the mouse pointer became visible
at its default position in the upper right-hand corner of the screen. When
the mouse pointer was close enough to the nearest feasible allocation, that
allocation was indicated by two numbers and by associated reference lines
marked in red. This information remained visible until the mouse pointer
had been moved far enough away from this allocation. If applicable, the next
allocation was then displayed.
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Subjects could also “fix” and later “release” an allocation by clicking the
left mouse button. Once a portfolio was fixed, then even if the mouse pointer
was moved, the numbers and reference lines turned green and stayed visible
on the screen until they were released. To choose this indicated portfolio and
proceed to the next decision problem, a subject could simply click the OK
button near the lower right-hand corner of the screen.
Some slight time pressure was introduced in order to impose a “cost” of
collecting information. The upper right-hand corner of the screen therefore
displayed how many seconds remained out of the original 30 allocated for each
choice. When time ran out, if the mouse pointer was over a feasible allocation,
or if one had been fixed by an earlier mouse click, then that portfolio was
recorded as the subject’s final choice. Otherwise a missing value was recorded
for that choice problem. In fact, no subject in our experiment ever exceeded
the time limit.
Figure 3 illustrates the basic experimental setup for a scenario where
pA = 1.5, pB = 1, and the probability of state A is pi = 0.5. The solid line
represents the budget constraint with slope −pB/pA = −1.5. The dashed
45◦-line marks all portfolios for which xA = xB. It intersects the budget line
at the indicated safe portfolio (xA = xB = 40).
The second dashed line is the graph of the expected value
EV (xB) = pixA + (1− pi)xB = pi
pA
(100− pBxB) + (1− pi)xB
of each portfolio as a function of xB alone, as one moves along the budget
line. In figure 3 its slope is the positive fraction 1/6. Hence, portfolios to the
left of the safe portfolio are stochastically dominated.
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Figure 3: A first-stage choice problem with pA = 1.5, pB = 1, pi = 0.5
2.2 First Stage
Each subject in the experiment faced 16 rounds of successive grouped choice
problems in up to three stages. At the first stage of each round, subjects
were graphically presented with a budget constraint p1x = 100, where p1 =
(p1A, p
1
B) and x = (xA, xB). The price vector p
1 was taken from the eight-
point set
P = {(1, 1.5), (2, 1), (1, 2.5), (3, 1), (1.5, 2), (2.5, 1.5), (3, 1.5), (2, 3)}
of price vectors. Furthermore, the probability pi of state A being chosen by
a pseudo-random number generator was either 0.5 or 0.67.
All subjects were eventually presented with the complete set of all possible
16 first-stage choice problems which can result from combining one of the
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eight possible price vectors with one of the two probability distributions.
The 16 possibilities were presented in random order, however.
2.3 Second Stage
Figure 4 shows how each subject’s first-stage choice was used to construct
the second-stage choice problem. The dashed line represents the first-stage
budget line; the subject’s portfolio choice is marked by one of the two dots
— e.g., x1 = (22, 67) in the figure. The subject, however, was shown only
the second-stage budget line p2x = 100. This was determined by first inter-
changing the two components of the first-stage price vector p1, then replacing
the new higher component with a different one chosen at random. Specifi-
cally, if the first-stage price p1B was lower, as in figure 4, and if x
1
B denotes the
amount allocated to asset B at the first-stage, then the second-stage price
p2B was determined by making a random choice from a uniform distribution
on the closed interval [100/x1B, 200/x
1
B], then rounding the result to the first
decimal place. In the figure, we have p2 = (1, 1.6).
In several cases, however, subjects chose first-stage portfolios that are
stochastically dominated because, as discussed in Section 2.1, they lie to the
left of the safe portfolio depicted in Figure 3. Worse still, in some cases
subjects chose portfolios so close to the extreme where the whole budget is
allocated to one security that our procedure would fail to determine a sensible
second-stage choice problem, because the respective budget line would have
had to be very steep (or flat). Our software, therefore, did not allow the
subject to proceed beyond the first stage in case: either (i) the first-stage
11
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0
xB
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intersection
possible 2nd stage
budget line
x1=(22,67)
Figure 4: A second-stage choice problem with pA = 1, pB = 1.6, pi = 0.5
choice was stochastically dominated; or (ii) the second-stage choice problem
would have involved a price ratio greater than 10 (or smaller than 0.1).
2.4 Third Stage
Even if the subject had been allowed to proceed to the second stage, the
portfolio chosen at this second stage could still fail to lie on the segment
of the budget line between: (i) the extreme portfolio with xB = 0; (ii)
the intersection of the two budget lines as depicted in Figure 4. Indeed,
if the subject’s second-stage choice was either stochastically dominated or
on the wrong side of the intersection marked in Figure 4, the computer
program would omit the third stage and, unless all 16 rounds had already
been completed, proceed directly to the next round in the sequence of three-
stage experiments. Otherwise, as Figure 5 indicates, the third-stage budget
12
xA
xB
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2nd stage choice
x1=(22,67)
x2=(61,24)
Figure 5: A third-stage choice problem with pA = 1.2, pB = 1.1, pi = 0.5
constraint was constructed by taking the line through the different actual
choices in the first two stages, then rounding both prices to the first decimal
place. For example, assuming that the subject chose x1 = (22, 67) at the
first stage, followed by x2 = (61, 24) at the second stage, the third-stage
price vector would be p3 = (1.2, 1.1) as indicated in Figure 5. Then Varian’s
supporting set consists of the line segment joining the first and second-stage
portfolios.
2.5 Background
The experiment was conducted at the University of Warwick on 20th May,
2008, in a computer Laboratory that had often been used for experiments
by other researchers. To avoid bias due to expert knowledge, we recruited
41 non-economics undergraduates (26 male and 15 female students had re-
sponded to our invitation before the deadline). All had previously agreed to
13
be included a database of potential recruits for economic laboratory experi-
ments and so were contacted by email.
The experiment was fully computerised. Standard software toolboxes in
experimental economics and psychology such as z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
and Mouselab (Johnson et al., 1986) do not offer the graphical displays and
the data structure we required. Instead, our experiment was programmed in
Visual Basic.
Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were first given the on-screen in-
structions reproduced in the Appendix. Then a training session began where
subjects were presented random budget lines and could make choices as often
as they wanted. In order to end the training session and start the experi-
ment, the subject had to click a button. This initiated a short countdown,
after which the first-stage choice problem of the first round was displayed.
After each subject’s last choice of the 16th round, the computer deter-
mined the amount they were owed, which was paid in cash. Everyone at-
tending and completing the experiment was given £5 of UK currency. In
addition, following the random lottery incentive scheme, subjects were told
that one of the choice problems they were going to be presented would be
randomly selected for an actual payment at the end of the experiment. The
sum of all the payments was £461.20, which works out on average to £11.25
per participant, including the £5 participation fee.
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3 A Nonparametric Statistical Test
3.1 Two Hypotheses: GARP and Random Choice
Bronars (1987) was concerned to show how GARP was a refutable hypothesis,
even with the kind of aggregate data that Varian had considered. Accord-
ingly, he had GARP as the null hypothesis, with Becker’s (1962) model of
uniformly random choice from the relevant budget line segment as a very
specific alternative.
Instead, our concern will be to refute Becker’s model of irrationality,
where possible, by showing that it cannot explain the high proportion of
observed choices satisfying GARP. Accordingly, our null hypothesis for each
experimental subject is that, throughout the course of the experiment, a
portfolio was always randomly selected from a uniform distribution over the
current budget line segment; moreover, the random choices from successive
budget lines are stochastically independent. Ignoring complications due to
rounding, the probability of satisfying GARP in any one choice experiment
is therefore the ratio of the length of the supporting set (the respective line
segment in Figure 5) to the total length of the budget line segment.
3.2 Implications of Uniform Randomness
Formally, let the discretised budget set of the typical ith third-stage choice
problem have Ki discrete elements (i ∈ {1, . . . , I}), of which exactly ki would
satisfy GARP if chosen. Under the null hypothesis, the proportion κi =
ki/Ki is the probability that the subject’s randomly chosen portfolio satisfies
GARP. Given a set Γ of I second or third-stage choice problems (up to a
15
maximum of 16), there are 2I (≤ 216 = 65, 536) different possible choice
patterns of GARP compliance and noncompliance. Let H denote the set of
all these 2I possible patterns, and G ⊆ H the subset of the I choice problems
in which the subject’s choices comply with GARP. Under the null hypothesis,
each choice pattern γ ∈ H occurs with probability
pγ =
∏
i∈G
κi ×
∏
i∈I\H
(1− κi).
For each integer ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I}, let H(`) ⊂ H denote the set of choice
patterns that include exactly ` choices that are GARP consistent, and I − `
that are not. Then the probability of a subject exhibiting exactly ` GARP
consistent choices is P` =
∑
γ∈H(`) pγ. Cumulating downwards gives, for each
integer z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I}, the probability 1− F (z) =∑I`=z P` that ` ≥ z.
3.3 Significance Tests
Let s denote the desired significance level of the test for GARP — for exam-
ple, 5%. Let zs denote the smallest possible integer satisfying 1−F (zs) ≤ s.
Then we reject the null hypothesis of uniform randomness at the significance
level s provided that the subject’s choice pattern satisfies GARP on at least
zs occasions.
In principle the critical proportion F (zs) needed for this test could be
calculated exactly from the finite stochastic process implied by the null hy-
pothesis. In practice we used an obvious Monte Carlo simulation procedure
to estimate F (zs) for each of the 11 particular values
s ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, . . . , 0.8, 0.9}.
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The dashed curve with squares as markers for the different significance levels
in Figure 6 displays the results of 1000 simulations, which were enough for
the observed proportions to converge. Of course, rounding implies the exact
probability Ps that F (`) ≥ s will exceed s unless s is chosen exactly equal
to one of the probabilities F (z) for z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I}; this explains why the
curve lies below the 45◦ line except at the end points s = 0 and s = 1. For
this reason, our test slightly favours the null hypothesis of random choice.1
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Test Statistics
Table 1 gives an overview of our experimental results. Subjects were faced
with an identical set of 16 first-stage choice problems, though the order in
which each subject faced them was selected at random. No subject breached
the time constraint of 30 seconds in any choice problem. Hence, in principle,
there could have been 16 second-stage choices. But for reasons explained
in Section 2.3, our procedure stopped after the first-stage choice if that was
too inferior. On average, there were 4.2 such instances per subject, leaving
us with a mean of 11.8 second-stage choices per subject — or 73.9% of the
possible 16. Of the inferior choices, 84% (3.5 per subject) were dominated;
1There is an exact test with non-integer critical proportions zˆs satisfying F (zˆs) = s
which takes the following form. Having found the integer critical value zs as in the main
text, classify as rational not only the subjects whose choice patterns satisfy GARP on
at least zs occasions, but also a random sample of those that satisfy GARP on zs − 1
occasions where, independently of the others, each subject is included with probability
[s− F (zs − 1)]/[F (zs)− F (zs − 1)].
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Figure 6: Test properties
Legend: The circular dots connected by solid lines represent actual observations of 39
subjects; the square dots connected by dashed lines represent a simulation using 1000
random players; the dotted line represents the theoretical level of significance.
the remaining 16% (0.7 per subject) were extreme in the sense that, if we had
continued with our algorithm, it would have required the price ratio p2A/p
2
B to
be either larger than 10 or smaller than 0.1. About 58.6% of the second-stage
choices (6.9 per subject) enabled us to construct a third-stage choice. The
remaining 4.9 second-stage choices per subject were either dominated (1.9 per
subject) or (3.0 per subject) on the wrong side of the point where the first-
stage and the second-stage budget lines intersect, thus making it impossible
to construct the relevant supporting set. Finally, 5.4 third-stage choices
per subject (77.5% of all third-stage choices) were both undominated and
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consistent with GARP. The remaining 1.6 third-stage choices either violated
GARP (1.4 per subject) or were stochastically dominated (0.2).
Table 1: GARP Consistency of Choices: Aggregated Data
Number of Stage
consistent choices 1 2 3
theoretical maximum 16 16 16
mean number of consistent choices 11.8 6.9 5.4
mean % of maximum 73.9% 43.1% 33.8%
mean % of previous column − 58.6% 77.5%
N = 41 subjects.
Any test of individual rationality requires disaggregated data. After all,
the fact that about 78% of all third-stage choices were GARP consistent
says little about how consistent each individual’s choices were. Table 2 lists
each subject’s ID in the experiment (for reference purposes only), followed
by statistics concerning their performance in the third-stage choice problems.
For the subjects with ID numbers in the range 1–21, columns 2–5 respectively
report the total number of third-stage choices I, then the number z and
proportion z/I of GARP consistent and undominated third-stage choices,
followed by the significance level p(z) of our rationality test. Columns 7–10
do the same for the subjects with ID numbers in the range 22–41.
The p-values that are reported in columns 5 and 11 of Table 2 are com-
puted to allow a separate non-parametric exact test for each subject, based
on all possible permutations of choice patterns. They specify the conditional
19
probability that a third-stage choice satisfies GARP, given that the subject’s
first and second stage choices did not rule out reaching the third stage.
4.2 Discussion of Results
Subject 13, for example, was a male who got to the third stage in 13 out
of the 16 maximum possible grouped choice problems. Of these 13, no less
than 12 (92%) third-stage choices lay within the support sets for GARP and
were undominated. The probability that his random choices would pass the
test at least 12 out of 13 times is just 0.007%. Hence, using our significance
level of 10%, we reject the null hypothesis that his 12 GARP consistent
choices were purely random. Note that two female subjects (#7 and #12)
did not reach any third-stage choice essentially because they always chose
only stochastically dominated portfolios in the first or second stage. The
following discussion focuses only on the remaining 39 subjects who reached
the third stage at least once.
Figure 6 displays the results graphically. Although our subjects often
violated GARP, they did so distinctly less often than the uniformly random
consumer would have done. For example, at the 10% significance level, 19
subjects (or 48.7%) were classified as rational. Comparing the curves for
stage three and for the simulation shows that our test is powerful enough to
distinguish clearly between: (i) actual subjects who could validly be classified
as rational; (ii) simulated random subjects that were incorrectly classified as
rational. It is worth recalling that Sippel’s (1997) procedure with an Afriat
choice efficiency index of 0.9 classified as rational no fewer than 98.5% of the
20
Table 2: GARP Consistency of Choices: Individual Data
ID total consistent p-value† ID total consistent p-value†
I z z/I p(z) I z z/I p(z)
1 6 5 0.83 0.050* 22 7 4 0.57 0.079*
2 11 7 0.64 0.219 23 6 3 0.50 0.316
3 3 3 1.00 0.032* 24 10 8 0.80 0.114
4 8 7 0.88 0.003* 25 11 8 0.73 0.244
5 5 4 0.80 0.128 26 14 12 0.86 0.062*
6 15 15 1.00 0.000* 27 3 2 0.67 0.355
7 0 0 — — 28 5 3 0.60 0.069*
8 11 10 0.91 0.003* 29 4 3 0.75 0.173
9 13 12 0.92 0.033* 30 2 0 0.00 1.000
10 10 9 0.90 0.002* 31 10 9 0.90 0.000*
11 0 0 — — 32 10 9 0.90 0.001*
12 3 2 0.67 0.381 33 6 3 0.50 0.546
13 13 12 0.92 0.007* 34 12 10 0.83 0.008*
14 3 3 1.00 0.045* 35 3 2 0.67 0.405
15 1 1 1.00 0.370 36 7 5 0.71 0.042*
16 14 9 0.64 0.249 37 11 10 0.91 0.003*
17 4 2 0.50 0.261 38 7 5 0.71 0.042*
18 3 2 0.67 0.333 39 6 6 1.00 0.003*
19 1 0 0.00 1.000 40 10 4 0.40 0.782
20 1 0 0.00 1.000 41 2 1 0.50 0.565
21 13 10 0.77 0.512
†Significance level of a non-parametric exact test. The null hypothesis is random
choice. An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level.
21
randomly generated consumers (as against 91.7% of the actual subjects).2
By contrast, our three-stage test classified only 5.2% of simulated subjects
as rational.
Finally, Table 3 reports the results of some tests for gender differences.
The share of GARP consistent choices was significantly greater for male
subjects. Likewise, the mean rejection probability reported in Table 2 was
much higher for female subjects. A possible explanation for this may lie in
the relative shares of portfolios chosen by each gender that were first-order
stochastically dominated, as reported in the last three rows of Table 3. In
all three stages female subjects chose between two and four times as many
dominated portfolios as their male counterparts. This may reflect a higher
proportion of male subjects with some prior experience of the type of in-
vestment problem and of graphical computer display that was used in the
experiment.
Table 4 gives the results of a pooled-sample logit regression whose depen-
dent indicator variable equals 1 if and only if the subject chose a first-order
stochastically dominated portfolio. To allow for the panel structure of the
data, the regression used a method of robust covariance estimation. The ex-
ogenous variables are gender, round, and the interaction term between these
two. We conducted the regression first for the whole sample, then for each
stage separately, both with and without the interaction term. The table
shows that the gender term is highly significant for all regressions except the
2Following Bronars’ (1987) proposal, Sippel actually compared his experimental data
with a set of 1000 demand vectors created using randomly determined constant budget
shares, which correspond to Cobb–Douglas preferences — for details, see Sippel (1996).
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Table 3: GARP Consistency of Individual Choices: Gender Differences
Gender Significance
female male level
mean s.e. mean s.e.
share of GARP consistent choices
3rd stage 0.647 (0.058) 0.815 (0.026) 0.010*
probability of rejecting substantive rationality
3rd stage 0.381 (0.083) 0.164 (0.052) 0.026*
share of dominated portfolios
1st stage 0.324 (0.029) 0.153 (0.018) 0.000*
2nd stage 0.256 (0.035) 0.108 (0.017) 0.000*
3rd stage 0.162 (0.045) 0.042 (0.014) 0.013*
*Significant at the 10%-level according to a two-tailed independent-
sample t test (checked for equality of variances).
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one for the third stage when an interaction term is included. This accords
with our previous result that, in general, female subjects chose dominated
portfolios more often than males. Also, there were no significant round or
learning effects, nor any significant interaction between round and gender.
5 Conclusion
We have reported and analysed an experiment in which subjects were faced
with a series of 16 grouped three-stage portfolio-selection problems. In previ-
ous studies significance levels were computed by tolerating small changes of
the chosen portfolios or budget lines — that is, they allow an Afriat efficiency
index below one. In contrast, for our test to be passed, a sufficient number
of portfolios chosen in a sequence of three-stage problems have to satisfy the
relevant inequalities exactly. This sharpens the distinction between truly
rational subjects and random players.
Overall, using a 10% significance level, only 19 out of 39 subjects (or
48.7%) could be classified as having made third-stage choices that all passed
our test of the standard GARP axiom of revealed-preference theory. Even
though our nonparametric test is easier to satisfy than many predecessors,
this proportion is distinctly lower than in previous studies. This may be due
in part to the fact that economics undergraduates subjects were specifically
excluded from our subject pool.
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Appendix
Instructions
Experimental Instructions (Please, read carefully)
This is an experiment in decision-making. The entire experiment should be
complete within about 30 minutes. Research foundations have provided funds
for conducting this research. Please, pay careful attention to the instructions
as a considerable amount of money is at stake. At the end of the experiment,
you will be paid privately. Your payoffs will depend partly on your decisions
and partly on chance, but not on the decisions of the other participants in the
experiment. You will receive 5 pounds as a participation fee. In addition you
will receive a payment whose calculation will be explained in the following.
During the experiment, we will speak in terms of experimental “tokens”
instead of pounds. At the end of the experiment your payoff will be calculated
in tokens and translated into pounds. The exchange rate between tokens and
pounds is stated on a note at your workplace.
In each decision problem, you will be asked to allocate an initial endow-
ment of 100 tokens between two accounts labeled A and B. The A account
corresponds to the vertical and the B account to the horizontal axis in a two-
dimensional graph. Each choice will involve choosing with the mouse pointer
a point on a blue line representing possible token allocations. In each choice,
you may choose any A and B pair that is on the blue line.
Each decision problem will start by having the computer select such a line
randomly, where each line permits a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 100
tokens on each account. The “prices” for the two accounts are stated on
28
the right side of the screen. An example: the blue line runs from 50 on the
vertical axis (account A) to 33 on the horizontal axis (account B). Hence,
the price for allocating a token to account A is two tokens, and for a token
on account B you have to give up three tokens of your initial endowment.
You have exactly 30 seconds for choosing one point on the blue line. The
time remaining is stated on the screen. Furthermore, you will receive an
acoustic signal during the last five seconds.
To choose an allocation, use the mouse to move the pointer over the blue
line. You will be shown the token allocations that belong to the respective
points on the blue line. Once you have found the allocation that you like
best, click with the left mouse button somewhere on the screen, and the most
recent allocation will be fixed. If you want to revise your decision, click the
left mouse button again and the line will be released. If you are satisfied
with your decision, click the “OK” button with the mouse pointer.
As noted above, you can choose only allocations that are located on the blue
line. You have 30 seconds for each choice. If you run out of time before
you fixed an allocation, the computer will automatically move on to the next
decision problem. If you did not touch the blue line at least once within the
30 seconds in order to display an allocation, the computer will record that
you did not make a decision; if you displayed an allocation but did not fix it
by mouse click, the computer will record the most recent allocation as your
choice. You cannot revise your decision after having clicked the “OK” button
or the 30 seconds have elapsed.
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Afterwards you are asked for your next decision. At the end you will be
informed that the experiment has ended and the computer determines you
payoff.
Your payoff is determined as follows: at the end of the experiment the com-
puter will randomly select one decision round. It is equally likely that any
round will be chosen. Afterwards the computer will decide whether account
A or B will be paid off. The probability of an account to be selected is stated
on the screen for each decision problem. The probability is either 50:50 or
67:33. Pay attention to the probabilities shown on the screen while making
your choice. At the beginning of each decision problem, the probabilities
briefly flash up in red color. Be careful: if the computer selects a decision
task in which you did not make a choice, your payoff will be zero.
Your payoff in tokens, your choice, and the account that has been selected,
will be shown in a popup window. Please, let our assistant know that you
have finished.
Your participation in the experiment, your choices, and your payoff will be
kept confidential. Only on the payoff receipt will we have to record your
name. In order to keep your privacy you should not talk to anyone about
the experiment and your choices (at least until the complete experiment has
ended). We would like to ask you not to talk during the experiment and to
remain silent until the end of the last round.
If you are ready for a trial run, click the “OK” button. If there are open
questions, please, contact one of our assistants.
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